http://repositorio.filo.uba.ar:8080/xmlui/handle/filodigital/6360 2026-04-14T23:48:53Z http://repositorio.filo.uba.ar:8080/xmlui/handle/filodigital/6475 Kant en español: elenco bibliográfico. México: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1997. 267 p. Granja Castro, Dulce María reseñado por Mario Caimi; Fil: Caimi, Mario. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repositorio.filo.uba.ar:8080/xmlui/handle/filodigital/6474 A política tensa: idéia e realidade na filosofia da história de Kant. São Paulo: Iluminuras, 1995. 182 p. Terra, Ricardo R. reseñado por Mariana Rojas Bermúdez; Fil: Rojas Bermúdez, Mariana. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repositorio.filo.uba.ar:8080/xmlui/handle/filodigital/6476 Sobre el placer y la felicidad. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1997. 93 p. Traducción, análisis y notas de Marcelo Boeri; Epicuro reseñado por Flavia G. Gioia; Fil: Gioia, Flavia G. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z http://repositorio.filo.uba.ar:8080/xmlui/handle/filodigital/6471 Indexicalidad y realismo modal In this paper, I attempt to throw some light on modal realism. Since it is David Lewis who has put forward the best arguments for thar position, I focus on his work. In the first, I point out that his approach does not provide an adequate account for the intuitive lack of symmetry between the actual and the possible. To begin with, I try to show that the strategy of appealing to both the spatio-temporal network and causality is not at all satisfactory. Secondly, I criticize the argument for modal realism that is based on theoretical benefits. Then, I defend the view that Lewis' indexical analysis of the concept of actuality does not satisfy his own criterion of acceptability: an analysis of actuality should account for the intuitions about our actual word. I claim thet Lewis' objections to other positions can be raised against his own position. Finally, I conclude that, even though Lewis is right in claiming that actualist conceptions do not explain why the possible is not part of the actual, the realist conception fail to account for the special ontological status that we intuitively grant to our own world. 43 ref.; Fil: Barrio, Eduardo Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Técnicas; Argentina; Fil: Barrio, Eduardo Alejandro. Universidad de Buenos AIres. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z